The last word: Celso Amorim
13 October 2003
Interview with the Foreign Minister of
Brazil, Ambassador Celso Amorim, published in
Newsweek on 13 October 2003.
Angry words are still flying over who wrecked the World Trade Organization meeting in Mexico last month. The debacle in Cancun had many fathers, but much of the fury has fallen on Brazil, which marshaled a dissenting bloc of 22 developing nations that demanded concessions on Western farm subsidies before moving forward with other issues.
Chief U.S. negotiator Robert Zoellick dubbed them the "won't-do nations." But don't tell that to Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, 61. One of Latin America's most experienced diplomats, he denies that Brazil was a spoiler or even that Cancun was a failure. Last week he spoke to Newsweek's Mac Margolis in Brasilia.
MARGOLIS: Robert Zoellick recently singled out Brazil for the collapse of the World Trade Organization meeting. Were you surprised?
AMORIM: Yes, I confess I was. During the meeting he had told me he thought our agenda was "businesslike." I understand the frustration. Everyone left [Cancun] frustrated. But in negotiations we all need to keep a cool head.
Why did the talks break down?
Not because of agriculture. The meeting broke down over the late-in-the game insistence by Western nations on discussing the "Singapore agenda"-rules for government procurement, trade financing and competitiveness. Up to then we were making progress and ready to negotiate amendments on agricultural subsidies. We are still eager to continue at the next meeting in Geneva. No one wins if we all stamp our feet and decide to take the ball home. No one benefits by saying, "OK, now we will only pursue bilateral trade agreements." There is no substitute for the WTO.
You returned from Cancun a hero, drawing a standing ovation in Congress. What did Brazil gain?
We were able to cut our losses. What was originally on the table, the proposal by the United States and European Union, would have meant greatly scaling back expectations from previous talks in Doha. The Brazilian delegation decided that the limited gains that were on the table in Cancun were not worth it. This was not obstruction. It was a deliberate position. And if we all take care not to let ourselves get carried away by emotions, we have the basis to continue negotiating. We achieved a political victory. Despite the initial resistance, we were treated as a legitimate negotiating party, not as a grouplet of countries over in the corner shouting and creating obstacles.
You speak of the dangers of unilateralism. But isn't this exactly what has been strengthened with the failure in Cancun, as the United States and other nations start cutting bilateral trade deals?
It's clear that the biggest problems in world commerce will not be resolved through bilateral trade agreements. Clearly, for Brazil, the WTO is fundamental. But it's also fundamental for the U.S. and for Europe. Who wins in a trade war? No one. Everyone loses in the end.
But some lose more than others. The poor, for instance.
Evidently, the poor have more to lose. But the WTO is also important for the U.S., which surely doesn't want a trade war with developing nations. This is why we have to quickly get back to the negotiating table in Geneva. I think we can-if, that is, there's the political will. We need to have patience.
Does the developing world have the luxury of waiting years for a better trade deal?
You can't measure patience in years. Patience means what we achieved with the G22, building a mechanism to listen to and respect all nations, even the smallest. It means spending maybe another hour of your time to broaden the discussion. It may take a day, or weeks, but other countries have to be heard in order to arrive at an agreement that is minimally acceptable to all.
What's the future of the G22?
The creation of G22 was undoubtedly a bold move. In the beginning we saw all kinds of attempts to discredit us. Many people thought it was going to implode, or splinter. But we managed to hold together. In the end, we were recognized as a credible negotiating force. I am convinced that we can continue in the same fashion.
Brazil is pressing its case for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. What's your plan?
Multilateral institutions are going through a moment of great confusion and redefinition. The Iraq crisis is the most obvious example, but not the only one. How can we ensure that the Security Council's decisions have legitimacy and the support of the majority of nations? As long as the Council is dominated by the victors of the second world war, obviously you do not have a representative body. Many countries feel the Council doesn't represent them. If you have new permanent Council members, you have to have developing nations. And if you think of developing nations, it's hard not to consider Brazil. The most glaring failing of the U.N. is that the Security Council does not fairly represent the world. This has to be corrected.
© Newsweek Inc.
Angry words are still flying over who wrecked the World Trade Organization meeting in Mexico last month. The debacle in Cancun had many fathers, but much of the fury has fallen on Brazil, which marshaled a dissenting bloc of 22 developing nations that demanded concessions on Western farm subsidies before moving forward with other issues.
Chief U.S. negotiator Robert Zoellick dubbed them the "won't-do nations." But don't tell that to Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, 61. One of Latin America's most experienced diplomats, he denies that Brazil was a spoiler or even that Cancun was a failure. Last week he spoke to Newsweek's Mac Margolis in Brasilia.
MARGOLIS: Robert Zoellick recently singled out Brazil for the collapse of the World Trade Organization meeting. Were you surprised?
AMORIM: Yes, I confess I was. During the meeting he had told me he thought our agenda was "businesslike." I understand the frustration. Everyone left [Cancun] frustrated. But in negotiations we all need to keep a cool head.
Why did the talks break down?
Not because of agriculture. The meeting broke down over the late-in-the game insistence by Western nations on discussing the "Singapore agenda"-rules for government procurement, trade financing and competitiveness. Up to then we were making progress and ready to negotiate amendments on agricultural subsidies. We are still eager to continue at the next meeting in Geneva. No one wins if we all stamp our feet and decide to take the ball home. No one benefits by saying, "OK, now we will only pursue bilateral trade agreements." There is no substitute for the WTO.
You returned from Cancun a hero, drawing a standing ovation in Congress. What did Brazil gain?
We were able to cut our losses. What was originally on the table, the proposal by the United States and European Union, would have meant greatly scaling back expectations from previous talks in Doha. The Brazilian delegation decided that the limited gains that were on the table in Cancun were not worth it. This was not obstruction. It was a deliberate position. And if we all take care not to let ourselves get carried away by emotions, we have the basis to continue negotiating. We achieved a political victory. Despite the initial resistance, we were treated as a legitimate negotiating party, not as a grouplet of countries over in the corner shouting and creating obstacles.
You speak of the dangers of unilateralism. But isn't this exactly what has been strengthened with the failure in Cancun, as the United States and other nations start cutting bilateral trade deals?
It's clear that the biggest problems in world commerce will not be resolved through bilateral trade agreements. Clearly, for Brazil, the WTO is fundamental. But it's also fundamental for the U.S. and for Europe. Who wins in a trade war? No one. Everyone loses in the end.
But some lose more than others. The poor, for instance.
Evidently, the poor have more to lose. But the WTO is also important for the U.S., which surely doesn't want a trade war with developing nations. This is why we have to quickly get back to the negotiating table in Geneva. I think we can-if, that is, there's the political will. We need to have patience.
Does the developing world have the luxury of waiting years for a better trade deal?
You can't measure patience in years. Patience means what we achieved with the G22, building a mechanism to listen to and respect all nations, even the smallest. It means spending maybe another hour of your time to broaden the discussion. It may take a day, or weeks, but other countries have to be heard in order to arrive at an agreement that is minimally acceptable to all.
What's the future of the G22?
The creation of G22 was undoubtedly a bold move. In the beginning we saw all kinds of attempts to discredit us. Many people thought it was going to implode, or splinter. But we managed to hold together. In the end, we were recognized as a credible negotiating force. I am convinced that we can continue in the same fashion.
Brazil is pressing its case for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. What's your plan?
Multilateral institutions are going through a moment of great confusion and redefinition. The Iraq crisis is the most obvious example, but not the only one. How can we ensure that the Security Council's decisions have legitimacy and the support of the majority of nations? As long as the Council is dominated by the victors of the second world war, obviously you do not have a representative body. Many countries feel the Council doesn't represent them. If you have new permanent Council members, you have to have developing nations. And if you think of developing nations, it's hard not to consider Brazil. The most glaring failing of the U.N. is that the Security Council does not fairly represent the world. This has to be corrected.
© Newsweek Inc.